Public Diplomacy Guidelines: An Oxymoron?

This blog post feels especially strange, I'm blogging about a blog post about a report about how to conduct diplomacy.

I'm pretty much sticking with my theme of writing about the UK's public diplomacy, seeing as I've got a bit of a lengthy paper coming up on that exact subject. Anyways, the report here itself was a quick read - basically, it's a series of guidelines produced by the Foreign Office in order to streamline policy actions across the ministry and for the future. Or, as blogger Robin Brown puts it, "the steps that the UK can take to exert influence on an issue or situation while recognizing the the UK is unlikely to be able to control outcomes." Granted, it also seems incredibly formulaic, which I don't think allows for the necessities of thinking on one's feet.

Public diplomacy is uncertain. Determining what it is can be difficult, as well as what it is not. Measuring its success is even more impossible. PD is so ambiguous, and while the FCO recognizes its effects are hard to quantify, the charts, boxes, and step by step directions are too formulaic for the flexibility required on the international stage. This seems out of step with what I've so far seen in my research as successful British public diplomacy...so maybe there's something to say about this approach after all.

Tacos and Kimchi...Great, now I'm hungry.

It would seem to me that Korea is on the right track in realizing it needs a re-branding strategy. I mean, I didn't even know Hyundai and Samsung were Korean...let along LG (Lucky Goldstar? What?!). So either Korea has been lacking greatly in the branding department, or I have been living under a rock like the Geico commercials. I'm leaning a little towards both.

According to a blog post "Korean Tacos and Kimchi Diplomacy" posted through the USC Center on Public Diplomacy, Korea's recent branding efforts have come from the realization that their products seem to have more recognition than the country itself. Clearly not an ideal situation. So the solution? Gastrodiplomacy. Korea is going to win the hearts of minds of the international community with Kimchi. And let's not laugh this off, it seems to have worked with Thailand. I mean seriously, who doesn't eat Thai food?

But really, will I visit Thailand, or even Korea, because of some Thai food or Kimchi? The article emphasizes the importance of listening in diplomacy, ever proving to be a difficult concept to understand and implement apparently. Rather than just advocating its gastrodiplomacy out, Korea could be looking for local opportunities to sponser gastro-events in foreign locales. Not a bad idea. Because then my taco wouldn't just be a taco that happens to be Korean, but it would be, say, a "brought to me by Korea" taco from those convenient food trucks that DC has grown to love so much. And that could make all the difference.

China Should Listen Up

Based on our readings and class discussions it seems that Chinese public diplomats have failed to read Cull's categorization of public diplomacy actions. If they had they would understand that listening to foreign publics is the "foundation" of all successful PD campaigns (Cull, 18).

China is relentlessly promoting its admirable culture and history, however not always in ways that will resonate with its audiences. As we saw in class at the beginning of the semester, one of China's attempts to promote itself in the United States involved rather boring video screens depicting accomplished Chinese citizens. While this would have caught my eye had I been in Times Square, it would not have held my attention and I doubt it would have much improved my knowledge or opinions of China.

If China were to elicit more feedback from its audiences it would have a much better idea of what programs will succeed and which will fail. In addition, as Professor Hayden said in class "They need to read audience analysis studies since the 1970's." China is aggressively pursuing international broadcasting operations in the US and around the world. However, much of its programming seems disingenuous  and reeks of propaganda. If it listened to its audiences, China would find that they are a bit more perceptive than the country believes and are turned off by these types of messages. It is telling that opinions of China are plummeting in the West, where it is attempting to implement these types of informational campaigns, but skyrocketing in the global south where it has invested in development aid. Clearly China is cultivating the soft power it desires through development actions, but loosing it based on unidirectional broadcasting.

Confucius Institutes and Chinese Soft Power

The topic of Chinese soft power has become popular among academics and policymakers in recent years. The following article looks specifically at Confucius Institutes (CIs) and how they are related to a broader Chinese soft power strategy.          

Paradise (2009) discusses Confucius Institutes (CIs) and soft power in China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power. He looks at China’s soft power initiatives as strategies for the country to assure foreign publics of its benign intentions in a time where there is much anxiety over the country’s increasing economic and military power. CIs are presented as one such way to win hearts and minds abroad. Paradise notes that little has been published on the impact of these programs on foreign perceptions of China, likely due to the relatively recent nature of the subject (the first was established in 2004).

In this article, he seeks to answer the following questions: What are the CIs doing? How do they fit into China’s “grand strategy,” if in fact there is such a strategy? How is soft power viewed in China? How are the Confucius Institutes thought of outside China? What impact, if any, are they having on China’s standing in the world?

In addition to funding and providing educational resources, Hanban’s (CI Headquarters, affiliated with the Ministry of Education) role in the CI initiative includes evaluation of instruction, management performance, and impact on society. Chinese embassies and consulates tend to support the initiative and occasionally act as intermediaries between applicants and Hanban.

An important finding was that some Chinese educators reject the idea of CIs as part of a larger soft power offensive, seeing it as an academic endeavor and less politically motivated. In fact, the notion of power as motivation is sometimes seen as negative and even aggressive. However, soft power has been described by President Hu Jintao as necessary for national strength.

Paradise goes on to explain the concern over CIs as a Trojan horse, and finds that CIs are forbidden from involvement in any activities that are inconsistent with the missions of the CI, and that they may not breach any Chinese laws and regulations. These and other regulations contribute to the general feeling of many American academics: that with the CIs, China is making the key decisions, not the university. However, there are many who welcome the assistance provided by the program. In terms of impact, it is difficult to determine whether or not the CI initiative affects perceptions of China, particularly because it is too soon to tell. (And increasing soft power is a long-term strategy.)

Working on the Railroad, or the railroad working on YOU?

It is China week!

For all of the thousands of you that subscribe to my commentaries both here and on Provincial Supertramp, you already know that I am a novice railroad historian and rail advocate. Yet, sadly, I had yet to find the occasion to incorporate my railfandom into my Public Diplomacy discussions, until now. In a near miraculous confluence of various seemingly unassociated subjects, I have managed to find a Mark Twain quotation that deals with the Chinese, the railroad, and can even be applied to the modern development of Chinese public diplomacy strategies. It is from a news commentary called "CHINESE RAILROAD OBSTRUCTIONS," from The San Francisco Daily Morning Call, on August 30, 1864.

"The Chinese in this State are becoming civilized to a fearful extent. One of them was arrested the other day, in the act of preparing for a grand railroad disaster on the Sacramento Valley Railroad. If these people continue to imbibe American ideas of progress, they will be turning their attention to highway robbery, and other enlightened pursuits. They are industrious."

This may seem like it does not have so much to do with public diplomacy, until you read about a recent project that has been dubbed by Western journalists as "Chinese railway diplomacy." This concept interested me because of two historic comparisons:

1. The role of the Chinese in helping to build the Transcontinental Railroad in the US, as unskilled, underpaid, and abused immigrant laborers, and

2. The striking difference between the way that the US has used the railroad to exert dominance over its region and the way that China is attempting to do so now.

In the 19th and 20th centuries, the United States and the UK both took on railroad projects in Latin America as a way to control transit and commerce in the region, and these projects were viewed as imperialist and exploitative, and were often poorly run. Now, very few railroads exist south of the US, and the ones that do are generally inefficient and in a state of disrepair. Contrastingly, the high-speed rail projects that China is sponsoring in Thailand, Laos, and now Kazakhstan are seen almost as goodwill offerings to neighbors, and generally believed to be relatively inexpensive and technologically advanced projects with a high potential for success. This is a part of the Chinese public diplomacy philosophy striving for "a good-neighborly and friendly surrounding environment, and environment for equal and mutually beneficial cooperation, and an objective and friendly publicity environment," as President Hu Jintao explained in 2004.

Perhaps this is an example of meddlesome Westerm entrepreneurial endeavors that, through translation to a Chinese environment, have actually been improved and made more benevolent. Though I am certain the US will not be exporting any competitive rail technologies via Amtrak any time soon. Ahem.

Sport Diplomacy: Quelling tensions between India and Pakistan, but not Boston and New York

Even though I don't understand a thing about cricket, I've actually been pretty interested in it for the past week. Last Monday I started an internship, and one of my co-workers has been talking about the India-Pakistan match, and how it's a monumental occasion. Being an avid baseball fan (I don't even want to talk about the Red Sox right now, I'm not going there, it's not starting off well), I'm interested. I mean, cricket is theoretically comparable to baseball....kind of...no, no, not really.

Sport diplomacy. It's a concept that I think is brilliant and I want to learn more about. Every two years during the Olympics there's a sense of international warmth and goodwill for a few weeks - it's hard not to notice. Sports transcend language, culture, and politics and can bring together enemies and/or those with whom a society may have nothing in common - save for the love of a sport and the common experience that goes with it, whether participating or just being a fan.

Obviously, sport diplomacy can ease tensions and put more lighthearted spirit on serious disagreements between nations. But, as mentioned in the blog post I linked to, it can be an effective tool of public diplomacy on a grassroots level as well, by putting people on an even playing field (pun very much intended). Instinct says that sport diplomacy would place more emphasis on competition, but in reality it's the simpler things in life that serve to bond people across borders and cultures.

Nation Branding: Where to Begin?

The idea of nation-branding was not an easy concept for me to understand. With anything, albeit is a product or a nation, there is that one word that pops into your mind, and is most likely to influence your perception. For example, Switzerland evokes "neutral", which leads me to see them as peaceful moderators. And even though world perception of America is not at its highest, many wouldn't argue the concepts of "freedom" or "democracy" that might come to mind as being a bad thing.

So how does a nation form its brand? That seems to be the hard part. I wouldn't wish that job on anyone. In "The Importance of National Reputation," Simon Anholt pretty much debunks the myth that private-sector marketing techniques can influence brands. This creates a kind of conundrum, because isn't that the point of marketing, to brand? But Anholt describes nation brands as something much more stable, and something that must be earned. He states that this can be difficult, since we like to keep to stereotypes at all costs and resist change.

Anholt proposes what he calls "Competitive Identity", which is pretty much a plan of nation branding that goes beyond just communication to encompass both the private and government sectors, including foreign policy, cultural products, exchanges, the media, and tourism. Anholt believes it is important for the country to promote a "clear, truthful narrative" of what the country is about. This is ideal, but sounds rather difficult to implement.

What seems to be at the root of the nation branding phenomenon is the "acting what you preach" in the name of your desired brand. A brand is only enforced by the actions behind it, what the world percieves of said country. While this seems a daunting task, it's not impossible. However it does entail cooperation between various sectors to enforce specific values, and to ensure that these are communicated in the intended way to foreign audiences. Which as we all know, is a daunting task.